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Comment on “Secure direct communication with a quantum one-time pad”
Holger Hoffmann, Kim Bostroem, and Timo Felbinger
Institut fu¨r Physik, Universita¨t Potsdam, 14469 Potsdam, Germany
(Dated: January 5, 2019)
In the paper [Phys. Rev. A 69, 052319 (2004)], a quantum direct communication protocol is
proposed which is claimed to be unconditionally secure even for the case of a noisy channel. We
show that this is not the case by giving an undetectable attack scheme.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk,03.67.Dd
In [1], Deng and Long propose a quantum direct com-
munication protocol which is briefly described as follows:
Bob creates a batch of qubits, each one randomly pre-
pared in one of the states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉, where |±〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉), and sends this batch to Alice. After Al-
ice has received the batch, she chooses a random subset
of the batch and performs measurements in bases ran-
domly chosen from Bz = {|0〉, |1〉} and Bx = {|+〉, |−〉}.
Alice announces publicly the positions of the measured
qubits, her choices of basis, and the results of her mea-
surements. Bob compares the measurement results with
his preparation at those positions where the bases coin-
cide. If the bit error rate is above a certain acceptable
threshold, the conversation is aborted. Otherwise Alice
encodes her message on the remaining qubits by applying
the operations 1 and σy to encode 0 and 1. For security
purposes, Alice also encodes check bits on randomly cho-
sen qubits. She sends all qubits back to Bob who then
decodes Alice’s message by measuring each qubit in the
corresponding preparation basis. As a final step, Alice
and Bob compare the check bits.
The security proof basically consists of two arguments.
First, the authors argue that it is sufficient to prove the
security of the first transmission, where the qubits are
sent from Bob to Alice. Second, the authors argue that
their protocol inherits the security of the BB84 scheme,
because the control mechanisms are essentially the same.
The second argument is erroneous because the proto-
col proposed by the authors provides no privacy ampli-
fication step in contrast to BB84. In fact, this step is
essential for the unconditional security of BB84 in the
presence of noise (see e.g [2, 3]). That is to say, if there
is noise on the channel, Eve can gain a certain amount of
information without being detected, by hiding her pres-
ence in the channel noise.
A successful attack scheme on the proposed protocol
can be given as follows. As usual, Eve is assumed to
be limited only by the laws of quantum mechanics. Say,
the bit error rate of the noisy channel is r. Eve replaces
the noisy channel by an ideal one, and then measures a
fraction 4r of the qubits during the first transmission ran-
domly in the bases Bz and Bx and resends them to Alice.
There is a 50% chance for Eve to pick the correct basis
and even if she picks the wrong basis she has another
50% chance of not causing a bit error. Therefore, the bit
error rate induced by Eve is r, which is indistinguishable
from the bit error rate produced by the channel noise,
so that the communication will not be aborted. Alice
then encodes her message and sends the qubits back to
Bob. Now Eve captures exactly those qubits on which
she has performed her previous measurements and which
have not been discarded due to the control mechanism.
She measures these qubits in the same bases as before, so
that she learns what operations Alice has performed on
them. Hence, she is able to eavesdrop a fraction 4r of the
message bits without being detected. Also the additional
check bit comparison does not reveal Eve’s action.
The above attack scheme shows that the proposed pro-
tocol, at least in its present form, is not unconditionally
secure for the case of a noisy channel.
If the protocol were enhanced by classical error correc-
tion and privacy amplification, as in the case of BB84,
the feature of direct communication would be lost, be-
cause after privacy amplification Alice and Bob would
end up with a shared random sequence and not with a
deterministic message.
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